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Abstract: 
Three to 5 years after job displacements, workers receiving the advance notice mandated by 
current law earn approximately 10% more than their nonnotified counterparts. This differential is 
not the result of firms systematically notifying persons with favorable reemployment prospects—
early warnings are disproportionately obtained by individuals expected to earn relatively low 
wages in subsequent employment. It is not clear, however, whether prenotification has a causal 
effect. The notification differential may occur because the advance notice is frequently provided 
by employers offering other kinds of adjustment assistance such as job counseling, skill 
retraining, supplemental unemployment benefits, or outplacement assistance. 
 
Article:  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prenotification of plant closings and mass layoffs allows displaced workers to search for new 
positions while still employed at their old jobs and to switch investments from firm-specific to 
general human capital. Notified workers may therefore find new positions faster and be more  
productive in the subsequent employment than their nonnotified counterparts. Citing these 
potential benefits, the Worker Assistance and Retraining Notification Act (P.L. 100-379), which 
requires most firms to provide workers with 60 days advance notice of impending displacements, 
was enacted by Congress in 1988 and became effective in 1989.
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Recent research, however, provides reason to question whether prenotification will yield the 
anticipated benefits. Using data from unemployment recipients in Arizona, Burgess and Low 
(1992) suggest that early notification only modestly increases predisplacement search—an extra 
week of notice increases predisplacement search by only 1-2 days for men and by less than 1 day 
for women. This may explain why prior notice leads to small or negligible reductions in 
postdisplacement joblessness. For instance, Ruhm (1992) finds that written announcements 
decrease the duration of nonemployment by less than 1 week.
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1. Discussions of previous legislative efforts and the events leading to the passage of the current 
act are contained in Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) and Addison and Portugal (1991). 
2. Earlier research (e.g., Addison and Portugal 1987; Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988; or Swaim 
and Podgursky 1990) uncovered larger reductions in nonemployment. The benefits of written notice are 
overstated in this work, however, for two reasons. First, the data sources used fail to distinguish among 
written notice, verbal warnings, and worker expectations of job terminations, in the absence of any 
notice. Second, the endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice is not adequately accounted for. 
These problems are discussed in greater detail by Addison and Portugal (1992) and Ruhm (1992). 
 
Less attention has been paid to potential wage effects of prenotification. This is both surprising 
and distressing. As Ruhm (1991) and Topel (1990) have shown, whereas postdisplacement 
joblessness is largely transitory, the associated earnings changes are long lasting. Thus, the main 
potential economic benefit of early notice is to ameliorate the wage reductions that typically 
follow involuntary job changes. For instance, over a 10-year period, a 1% increase in discounted 
earnings would raise total wages by more than an initial 5-week reduction in joblessness. 
 
Limited previous research on wage effects suggests that the earnings increases associated with 
advance notice are small or nonexistent. In the most comprehensive study to date, Ehrenberg and 
Jakubson (1988) conclude that "advance notice had very little impact on survey date . . . earnings 
of [displaced] workers" (p. 73).
3
 The analysis presented below challenges this finding. Workers 
receiving the type and duration of advance notice now mandated by law are shown to earn 
approximately 10% per week more than their counterparts, 3-5 years after the displacements. 
 
These wage differentials do not occur because firms systematically provide lengthy written 
notice to individuals with favorable reemployment prospects. To the contrary, when they have 
the discretion to do so, employers disproportionately warn persons with relatively low expected 
subsequent earnings. 
 
Despite these strong results, it is not clear that early notification causes, rather than merely 
correlates with, higher wages. The ambiguity occurs because there is no evidence of especially 
large gains for notified individuals obtaining new positions as the result of predisplacement 
search. Since the opportunity to engage in employed search is thought to be the major 
mechanism by which prenotification alleviates adjustment problems, this absence suggests that 
other factors may be important. In particular, firms voluntarily providing formal notice may also 
be relatively likely to offer other types of assistance to displaced workers (e.g., outplacement 
programs, job-search counseling, retraining, and extended unemployment benefits). This 
supplemental assistance may be responsible for the wage gains or operate in conjunction with the 
provision of the early notification. 
 
The next section describes the data set, sample analyzed, and advantages of these data over those 
used in most previous research. Section III presents reduced-form estimates showing the 
relationship between advance notice and postdisplacement earnings. Section IV follows with 
three tests for endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice. Section V investigates how 
advance notice wage differentials vary across durations of nonemployment and uses this 
information to informally test whether the gains associated with early notification result from 
longer or more efficient pre- displacement search. Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
3. Similarly, Podgursky and Swaim (1987) find that notification is associated with slightly higher 
wages for females working in white-collar occupations but has no effect for other individuals. Nord and 
Ting's (1991) recent study does find a positive wage benefit of advance notice. Their results are difficult 
to interpret, however, because they exclude individuals surprised by displacements and thus compare 
workers with written notice to counterparts anticipating their terminations in the absence of formal 
notice. The latter is a (nonrandomly) selected group of the nonnotified. (Addison, Fox, and Ruhm [1992] 
provide further discussion of these problems.) They also delete all persons displaced as the result of 
partial layoffs. As shown below, notification differentials are smaller for this group than for those losing 
jobs in plant closings. 
II. DATA 
Data for this study are obtained from the Displaced Worker Supplements (DWS) to the January 
1988 and 1990 Current Population Surveys (CPS). Each DWS contains retrospective information 
on the previous job histories and labor market status of a nationally representative sample of 
workers suffering permanent job loss during the previous 5 years. Additional information on 
current labor force status is available from the regular monthly CPS. 
 
The sample analyzed includes workers between the ages of 25 and 60 (at the survey date), who 
lost jobs as the result of a business failure, plant closure or relocation, or a layoff resulting from 
slack work or position or shift abolished. Persons terminating self-employment or jobs in 
agriculture, construction, or the armed forces are excluded. To eliminate transitory wage changes 
occurring during training or probationary periods, the sample used for most of the analysis is 
limited to persons displaced at least 2 full years before the survey date.
4
 Thus, respondents to the 
1988 ( 1990 ) DWS are included if they lost jobs between 1983 and 1985 ( 1985 and 1987). This 
restriction also reduces the selection bias occurring because some workers remain out of work at 
the survey date. 
 
The 1988 and 1990 DWS include three questions pertaining to advance notice. The first inquires 
whether the worker did "expect a layoff or had received advance notice of a layoff or plant or 
business closing." This question, which contains no information on either the type or timing of 
notice, was also incorporated in the 1984 and 1986 DWS and provided the only information on 
early notification available to researchers using these data sources (e.g., Addison and Portugal 
1987; Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988; Swaim and Podgursky 1990; Fallick 1991).
5
 Supplemental 
questions added to the 1988 and 1990 DWS inquire if the respondent had "been given written 
advance notice that the business would be closed or that he/ she would be laid off” and, if so, 
"how long before he/she was to be laid off did he/she receive that notice?" Responses permitted 
for the last question are: less than 1, 1-2, and greater than 2 months.
6
  
 
Individual, job, and geographic characteristics are included as explanatory variables in the 
regression analysis (see App. A). In addition to data obtained from the DWS and CPS, these 
include regressors constructed using information from other sources. Covariates indicating 
residence in right- to-work states and three-digit industry and occupation unionization rates were 
added to proxy collective bargaining status on the predisplacement job. The state or standard 
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) unemployment rate was also included, to account for 
differences in local labor market economic conditions.
7 
 
 
4. Sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of recently displaced workers is tested for below.  
5. A few researchers have utilized non-DWS data. Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984) used enterprise-
level data for the state of Maine. More recently, Lazear (1990) has analyzed aggregate time-series cross-section 
data from 23 countries, and Deere and Wiggins (1989) have exploited a U.S. General Accounting Office random 
sample of establishments with mass layoffs during 1983 and 1984. Hamermesh (1989) provides a useful summary 
and evaluation of recent research on displaced workers, and Addison and Portugal (1991) review the literature on 
advance notice. 
6. Nord and Ting (1991), Addison and Portugal (1992), and Ruhm (1992) have used the 1988 DWS to 
investigate postdisplacement joblessness. Nord and Ting have also briefly used this data set to examine wage effects. 
To my knowledge, there has been no detailed analysis of postdisplacement earnings using the 1988 or 1990 DWS. 
7. The DWS identifies geographic location at the survey date, not at the time of displacement. Since 
approximately one-fifth of the sample changes locations, estimates of local labor market effects could be biased. To 
the extent that moves typically involve departing depressed areas in favor of locations with low unemployment, the 
impact regional conditions will be understated. Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) and Howland and Peterson (1988) 
compare estimates with and without movers included in the sample and conclude that these biases are quite small. 
After the aforementioned exclusions, the sample consists of 3,650 individuals, 2,732 of whom 
were reemployed at the survey date. Forty-six percent of respondents reported being surprised by 
their job terminations and 38% anticipated permanent layoffs in the absence of written notice. 
The latter group is hereafter described as informally notified. While written notice was received 
by 16% of displaced workers, fewer than 6% obtained the 2 months of formal notice now 
required by law. More than two-thirds of respondents expecting their jobs to end did so without 
being formally notified. This makes it doubtful that previous research using the general advance 
notice question reveals much about the impact of lengthy written notification. 
 
III. REDUCED-FORM ESTIMATES 
This section presents estimates of the reduced-form earnings equation  
 
W = Xα + Nß+ ε,                               
 
where W is the natural log of real weekly earnings, X is a vector of covariates, N a vector of 
dummy variables indicating specified types of advance notice, and ε is the regression disturbance 
term. 
 
Estimates of equation (1) will indicate the effect of legally mandated advance notice under only a 
restricted set of circumstances. Two potential problems deserve particular attention, when 
considering the results of prior research. First, there is no reason to believe that persons 
responding affirmatively to a general question asking whether the job loss was expected will 
have the same subjective ex ante probabilities of displacements as if formal notice had been 
received.
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 Data on formal notice, available in the 1988 and 1990 DWS, help to solve this 
problem. A second and more fundamental issue is that, even when adequate information on 
advance notice is available, the expected value of the error term may vary with notification status 
(i.e., E(ε |N = 0)  (E ε|N = 1)) , with the result that the prenotification estimate could be biased 
either upward or downward. 
 
There are several reasons why N and ε could be correlated. Since post- displacement wages are 
observed only for persons employed at the survey date, sample selection bias may exist. Ignoring 
nonrandom reemployment, the notification estimate will be biased if advance notice is (1) 
systematically provided to workers with low or high potential wages (the endogeneity problem) 
or (2) accompanied by other types of assistance that raise subsequent earnings (the problem of 
spurious correlation). These issues are the focus of Sections IV and V. 
 
A. Demographic Covariates 
The first column of table 1 shows variable means for the full sample (unbracketed) and for the 
subsample reemployed at the survey date (bracketed). The second and third columns display 
regression coefficients and associated t-statistics on the demographic covariates obtained by 
estimating equation (1), which also includes the vector of advance-notice variables. 
 
The results are completely standard and so warrant only brief attention. Postdisplacement 
earnings are relatively high for married workers, whites, males, persons displaced by plant 
 
8. For instance, one logical rule would be to respond that the termination was expected 
(unexpected) if the subjective probability was greater (less) than 50% over a specified time period. If 
mandated formal notice raises this probability closer to one, the gains to mandatory prenotification will 
be understated. 
(1) 
 
 
closings or residing in areas with low unemployment, and those with the most time to recover 
from the loss of jobs. Wages increase with prior earnings and health insurance coverage but 
decline with the proxies for unionization. Persons previously working part-time receive a 
positive wage differential, which is not surprising since the predisplacement wage has been 
controlled for. For the same reason, we expect and find a positive (negative) relationship 
between subsequent earnings and education (seniority). Ceteris paribus, survey date earnings are 
highest for persons with intermediate levels of work experience. 
 
 
 
 
B. Advance Notice 
We next discuss the relationship between prenotification and survey date earnings. The four 
advance notice dummy variables UNWRIT, WRIT1, WRIT2, and WRIT3 are defined to 
indicate, respectively, informally notified respondents and persons receiving less than 1, 1-2, and 
greater than 2 months written notice. One shortcoming of the DWS is that it fails to ascertain 
whether formally notified workers anticipated their job terminations prior to receiving written 
notice. Thus it is not clear whether the appropriate control group is persons surprised by 
displacements or those expecting the loss of jobs in the absence of written notice.  
 
Table 2 presents results for three alternative comparisons. In model 1, the control group is all 
persons not receiving formal announcements, whether they are nonnotified or informally 
notified.
9
 This specification is appropriate if the receipt of informal and written notice are 
statistically independent events.
10
 The second model controls for both written and informal 
notice, implying that the formally notified are contrasted with counterparts surprised by the loss 
of jobs. Since the latter group is likely to possess relatively poor information about labor market 
conditions ( and hence inferior reemployment prospects), the resulting advance-notice coef-
ficients should be larger than in the previous model. Model 3 shows the difference in the 
coefficients on formal and informal notice. If workers anticipating job departures in the absence 
of written notice are unusually well informed about labor market conditions, this specification 
will produce the smallest notification effect. 
 
 
9.  The full set of demographic, industry, occupation, and geographic covariates are included in 
these regressions and throughout the remainder of the article. 
10. As discussed in Sec. IV, this condition is unlikely to hold. 
Workers receiving lengthy written notice earn substantially more than their counterparts at the 
survey date. The wage premium associated with 2 or more months of formal notice ranges  
between 8.1% and 10.5%, depending on the comparison group used.
11
 In contrast, the 
coefficients on UNWRIT, WRIT1, and WRIT2 are negative or only slightly positive, which 
explains why strong notification effects have not been revealed in previous work using broad 
definitions of advance notice.
12
 
 
The wage differentials associated with extended written notice are sizable and could indicate an 
important benefit from mandatory advance notice. The next two sections attempt to determine 
whether early announcements cause elevated earnings or are merely associated with them, due to 
endogeneity bias or spurious correlation. 
 
IV. ENDOGENOUS PROVISION OF ADVANCE NOTICE 
Prior to 1989, only four states (Hawaii, Maine, South Carolina, and Wisconsin) required 
prenotification of impending job terminations.
13
 (Connecticut also stipulates that employers must 
continue health benefits for 120 days.) The reduced-form models estimated above therefore 
indicate the relationship between voluntarily provided advance notice and survey date earnings. 
If firms notify employees on a nonrandom basis, these estimates may poorly indicate the impact 
of mandated prenotification. For example, employers may try to minimize premature quits by 
disproportionately notifying workers with poor reemployment prospects. In this case, early 
warnings will be associated with only small increases (or even reductions) in pay. Alternatively, 
firms may offer advance notice in combination with other forms of adjustment assistance (e.g., 
retraining) that lead to higher postdisplacement earnings. If so, the reduced-form estimates will 
overstate the benefits of prenotification. 
 
Three tests for the direction of endogeneity bias are presented below. The results of several 
"natural experiments" are considered first. Second, a search-theoretic perspective is used to show 
how endogeneity bias might influence the reemployment outcomes of formally notified workers. 
Third, a treatment/effects model is estimated, with firms assumed to provide the treatment 
(written notice) when the costs of failing to do so exceed the associated benefits. 
 
Each of the three methods indicates that formal notification is disproportionately provided to 
workers with inferior reemployment prospects (i.e., E(ε|N = 1) < E(ε|N = 0)), which suggests that 
the reduced-form estimates of Section III understate the size of the written notice wage premium. 
The downward bias could be offset, however, if unobserved confounding factors  
 
11. The predisplacement wage is included in the equation to control for heterogeneity not 
captured by the observable characteristics. Two alternative specifications were also estimated. In the 
first, the previous wage was excluded; in the second, changes in wages were used as the dependent 
variable. These specifications constrain the coefficient on previous earnings to equal zero and one, 
respectively. The wage differential associated with WRIT3 increases slightly when previous wages are 
excluded (to 11.0%, 11.3%, and 10.5% in models 1, 2, and 3) and falls somewhat when the dependent 
variable is wage changes (to 7.8%, 9.7%, and 5.8%). 
12. For example, using a general measure, Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) uncover statistically 
insignificant prenotification differentials ranging from —3.2% to 4.6%. 
13. The laws were weak in some states (e.g., a $500 fine per employer for violations in South 
Carolina) but strong in others (e.g., 45 days written notice plus severance pay equaling the difference 
between the worker's average weekly wage and 4 weeks of unemployment benefits in Hawaii). Further 
information on state laws is available in Abbey (1989) and Addison and Portugal (1991). 
 
which ease the adjustment process of dislocated workers are positively correlated with 
voluntarily provided advance notice. This possibility is the focus of Section V. 
 
A. "Natural" Experiments 
One method of reducing the endogeneity problem is to identify groups for whom advance notice 
is provided on a more random basis than for all displaced workers. This provides a natural 
experiment for the endogeneity of voluntarily provided prenotification. Results of three such 
natural experiments are presented below. 
 
In the first case, workers involved in plant closings are compared to those losing jobs due to 
partial layoffs. There are several reasons to expect advance warnings to be provided on a more 
random basis in the former case than in the latter. First, when the entire plant is being closed, it 
will be difficult to selectively inform workers of impending displacements and virtually 
impossible to provide written notice to only a few employees (unless firms can credibly lie about 
the nature of the reduction in force). Conversely, when only a portion of employees are 
terminated, nonnotified workers may find it difficult to determine whether they will be affected. 
Employers also have discretion in deciding whom to lay off and may be able to combine the 
layoff and notification choices in ways that make the notified group even less representative of 
the population of job losers.
14
 
 
The second natural experiment contrasts workers in highly unionized industries and occupations 
to their counterparts in sectors with low union densities. Contractual provisions requiring 
advance notice are more common for union than nonunion workers, which implies that unionized 
firms will be less able to notify on a discretionary basis.
15
 Even where collective bargaining 
contracts do not mandate advance notice, unions are likely to pressure firms to supply it. 
Furthermore, the ability of unions to disseminate information will make it more difficult for 
employers to notify selectively. In the analysis below, workers are classified as employed in 
sectors with low union densities if their three-digit (predisplacement) industry and occupation 
unionization rates are both below the sample average (18.3% and 20.0%, respectively) and as 
working in highly unionized sectors if both percentages are above the mean. 
 
The enactment of state laws requiring advance notice or the continuation of benefits prior to the 
passage of federal legislation is assumed to proxy an environment where employers are strongly 
encouraged to prenotify workers and to be associated with widespread and less discretionary pro-
vision of advance notice.
16
 The final natural experiment therefore involves contrasting workers 
residing in states with employment regulations (i.e., Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, South 
Carolina, and Wisconsin) to peers in states without similar legislation. Since notification periods 
are substantial in three of the four states with mandates (45 days in Hawaii and 60 days in Maine 
and Wisconsin), this comparison is likely be most revealing when considering lengthy written 
notice. 
 
14. Gibbons and Katz (1991) present evidence that displacements are less random for partial 
layoffs than plant closings. 
15. Brown (1987) shows that unionized and nonunionized establishments are equally 
likely to provide some type of advance notice, but unionized employers provide longer and more 
specific notice. This natural experiment should therefore focus on written notice of medium or 
long durations. 
16. All state advance notice laws have exemptions; thus, even in these locations, some 
displaced workers will not receive notice. 
 
Results for the three natural experiments, summarized in table 3, suggest that voluntary notice is 
disproportionately provided to workers with low expected postdisplacement wages. The 
evidence is especially convincing when considering lengthy formal notification. Among the three 
groups notified on a relatively random basis—those involved in plant closings, working in highly 
unionized industries and occupations, or living in states with employment dismissal regulations 
— the wage differential associated with 2 months written notice is 18.2%, 25.6%, and 38.1%, 
respectively. For the three categories likely to be notified on a more discretionary basis— 
workers displaced by partial layoffs, working in sectors with low union densities, or residing in 
states without dismissal laws—the corresponding earnings premia are a much smaller —3.2%, 
3.4%, and 9.9%. 
 
 
Conversely, the coefficients on WRIT1 and WRIT2 never differ significantly across comparison 
groups and the pattern of disparities is ambiguous. For example, intermediate (1-2 months) 
written notice appears most beneficial for workers displaced by plant closings or leaving 
unionized sectors, where warnings are provided relatively randomly, but also for persons 
residing in states without dismissal regulations, where firms exercise greater discretion in 
notification decisions. Given these results and the small size of the associated reduced form 
coefficients, a reasonable working assumption is that short and intermediate periods of written 
notice have no impact on subsequent wages. 
 
B. Nonemployment Survival Rates 
The natural experiments suggest that lengthy formal notice is systematically provided to workers 
with poor reemployment prospects. Further evidence is provided by a comparison of the 
nonemployment durations of notified and nonnotified workers. 
 
Following Lancaster (1979), we can specify the probability that an individual leaves joblessness 
over the short interval [t, t + dt] by 
 
h(t)d(t) = {1 – G[ (t)]} r(t)dt, 
 
where h(•) is the hazard rate, G(•) the distribution function of wage offers, r(•) the rate at which 
wage offers are received, and , , the reservation wage (optimal stopping point), which is 
obtained from a model of search. 
 
The hazard rate, expressed in terms of the underlying density and distribution functions, f(•) and 
F ( • ), is 
 
h(t)=  
 
and, integrating (2), the probability that search (S) exceeds T periods is  
 
pr(S > T)= 1— F(T) = exp - (v)dv = exp [—H(T)],  
 
where H(•) is the integral of the hazard function. 
 
If nonnotified workers do not begin searching until the displacement occurs and notified 
individuals initiate search as soon as the job termination is announced (and do so with the same 
intensity as if they were already out of work), the probability that the nonemployment duration 
exceeds T periods, conditional on receiving N periods of advance notice, is 
 
pr(S > T|N) = 1 — F(T + N) = exp[—H(T + N)]. 
 
The difference between (3) and (4) represents the maximum decrease in survival probabilities 
associated with N periods of prenotification. Smaller reductions occur if (1) notified workers 
search less intensively for new jobs or have higher reservation wages during the period of predis-
placement search or (2) some nonnotified individuals anticipate displacements and begin 
searching for new positions while still employed at the old job. In the extreme case, 
prenotification would have no effect on survival rates. 
 
The search model therefore predicts that advance notice should either speed or have no effect on 
reemployment. There is no theoretical reason to expect prenotification to increase spell 
durations; evidence that it does so provides a clear indication that early warnings are 
disproportionately provided to workers with low reemployment hazards. If hazard rates and 
expected earnings are positively correlated, reduced-form wage regressions will then understate 
the earnings differential associated with advance notice. 
 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Figure 1 displays the difference in cumulative reemployment probabilities F(•), at various 
durations of joblessness, for notified workers as compared to individuals surprised by the loss of 
jobs. Positive (negative) percentages imply higher (lower) rates of reemployment for persons 
receiving notice. For example, 15.0% of nonnotified individuals are jobless for 1 week or less, 
before finding a new position. The corresponding percentages are 20.8% for the informally 
notified and 14.4%, 15.3%, and 21.7%, respectively, for workers with less than 1, 1-2, and over 
2 months written notice. The difference in cumulative reemployment probabilities, compared to 
 
workers failing to anticipate displacements, therefore is 5.8%, —0.6%, 0.3%, and 6.7% for the 
four types of advance notice. 
 
Reflecting their more extensive opportunities for predisplacement search, notified workers are 
more likely than nonnotified individuals to avoid joblessness or be out of work for only a short 
period of time. Among the formally notified, however, this does not translate into a long-term 
advantage. Persons obtaining written warnings are more likely to remain jobless beyond 7 
weeks, and the propensity to experience extended joblessness is particularly pronounced for 
individuals with lengthy written notice. For example, this group is 12.6% more likely than 
persons surprised by displacements to remain jobless for more than 20 weeks (50.7% vs. 63.3%). 
 
A set of probit models was estimated to investigate whether the patterns observed in figure 1 
result from differences in observable characteristics. In each equation, the dependent variable 
was set to one (zero) if joblessness exceeded (was less than or equal to) the specified number of 
weeks and the full set of explanatory variables was controlled for. The resulting coefficient 
estimates, which are summarized in Appendix table Al, are entirely consistent with figure 1. 
Lengthy written notice is associated with higher probabilities of both quick reemployment and 
extended joblessness. The notification effect is maximized at 20 weeks and is substantial 
between 15 and 45 weeks. Briefer periods of advance notice also tend to be correlated 
with relatively high joblessness survival rates, while informally notified individuals become 
reemployed relatively rapidly. 
 
These results indicate that firms systematically supply lengthy written notice to workers with low 
reemployment hazards. The relationship between nonemployment durations and 
postdisplacement earnings was next examined by estimating the reduced-form wage equation, 
with weeks of joblessness included as a supplementary covariate. These regressions (not shown) 
reveal that each additional week of nonemployment is associated with a statistically significant 
0.3% reduction in survey date earnings.
17
 Thus, formal notice is provided to workers with slow 
rates of reemployment who, on average, have poor earnings prospects. If the relationship 
between the speed of reemployment and subsequent earnings is independent of notification 
status, reduced-form wage equations, such as those estimated in Section III, therefore will 
understate the wage differentials obtained by formally notified workers.
18
 
 
C. Sample Selection and Treatment/Effects Estimates 
This section provides several types of additional information on the nature of the endogeneity 
bias. It first examines whether the estimated notification effects suffer from reemployment 
selection bias, which could be problematic since wage data are available only for respondents 
who are working at the survey date. Next we consider whether the findings are sensitive to the 
exclusion of recently displaced workers from the analysis. Finally, a treatment/effects framework 
is used to model the process determining who receives early notice. 
 
Column 1 of table 4 repeats results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) wage equation originally 
displayed in model 2 of table 2. Column 2 provides corresponding estimates corrected for 
reemployment selection bias using Heckman's (1979) two-step method. This involves including 
the inverse Mills ratio (λw) from a first-stage probit model as a supplemental regressor in the 
second-stage wage equation. In addition to the full set of demographic and advance-notice 
variables, the probit reemployment equation controls for the average state weekly unemployment 
benefit paid in 1986.
19 
 
The coefficient on λw provides weak evidence of a positive correlation The coefficient on λw 
provides weak evidence of a positive correlation between potential wages and reemployment 
probabilities. The selection effect is imprecisely measured, however, and the null hypothesis of 
no selection bias cannot be rejected. The two-step estimates also imply slightly larger earnings 
 
17.  Complementary evidence indicating that well-paid individuals have relatively high rates of 
reemployment at the survey date is provided in Sec. IVC. 
18.  Evidence casting doubt on the assumption of independence is presented and discussed in Sec. 
V. 
19.  Whereas unemployment insurance benefits have either a small effect on subsequent wages 
(Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976; Burgess and Kingston 1976) or no effect at all Classen (1977), virtually 
all studies find a strong positive association between benefit levels and unemployment durations. Thus, it 
may be reasonable to exclude the UI benefit from the wage equation, while including it in the selection 
equation. Jones (1988) has previously used the assumption that UI influences reservation wages but has 
no independent impact on reemployment outcomes as an identifying restriction when testing the 
predictions of search theory. 
 
 
differentials associated with extended written notice than were obtained by OLS (13.9% vs. 
10.5%). Thus, correcting for reemployment selection bias either has no effect or slightly raises 
the estimated benefits of formal notice. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 examine whether the notification estimates are sensitive to the exclusion of 
recently displaced workers. The regression in model 3 is identical to that in model 1 except that 
the area unemployment rate is not controlled for. This exclusion has no effect on the notice 
coefficients. Model 4 estimates the same wage equation as model 3 but adds to the sample 
respondents losing jobs during the 2 calendar years immediately preceding the survey date (e.g., 
persons terminated in 1988 and 1989 for the 1990 DWS). A comparison of columns 3 and 4 
demonstrates that the addition of recently displaced individuals has virtually no impact on the 
estimated notification effects. 
 
To provide more precise information on the nature of the endogenous notification decision, a 
treatment/effects model of advance notice is specified and estimated next. Firms are assumed to 
offer workers the "treatment" (advance notice) if the net cost (cost minus benefit) of failing to do 
so is positive. Thus, notification status is 
 
N=  if C = Zδ + µ  0, 
 
(5) 
where C is the net cost of withholding notice, Z is a vector of covariates which affect net costs, N 
indicates advance notice, and µ is an error term. 
 
Rewriting equation (1), postdisplacement wages are specified by 
 
W = Xα + Nß + ε, 
 
where W, X, and ε are as previously defined. If µ and ε are distributed bivariate normal with 
mean zero and covariance ζµε, 
 
E(W | N = 0) = Xα + E(ε|N = 0), 
and 
E(W | N = 1) = Xα + ß + E(ε|N = 1), 
where 
E(ε|N = 0) =  |  | 
 
and 
E(ε|N = 1) =  |  |, 
 
for   ( • ) and ( • ) the probability distribution function and cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal distribution evaluated at Zδ. 
 
Consistent estimates for the treatment/effects model are obtained using a two-stage technique. In 
the first stage, the probit equation implied by (5) is estimated to obtain ( • ) and ( • ). Next, 
the wage equation 
 
W = Xα + Nß + λγ + η  
 
is estimated, with λ = —  (•)/[1 — (•)] for nonnotified individuals and λ =   (•)/ (•) for 
persons receiving notice. The reported standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, and 
the coefficient  provides an estimate of .20 
 
Employers failing to provide advance notice may be subject to costs in the form of damage to 
their reputations, productivity reductions by continuing employees, and legal expenses. The costs 
vary across geographic locations (e.g., being higher in states with mandatory or voluntary 
programs encouraging prenotification) and, as evidenced by the recent federal legislation, have 
probably increased over time. State and time dummy variables are included in the probit 
notification equation to capture these variations. Industry and occupation unionization rates are 
similarly incorporated, since contractual advance notice provisions are most common in 
unionized firms and unions increase the information available to workers. The reason for 
displacement is also controlled for because it is more difficult (and hence more costly) to conceal 
information on plant closings than on selective layoffs. 
 
20.  Further information on the treatment/effects model is provided by Greene (1990). 
(6) 
(7) 
Firms also obtain benefits from withholding advance notice. Chief among these is likely to be the 
reduction in premature quits among workers with favorable employment alternatives.
21
 
Premature quits will be relatively uncommon (and so notification costs relatively low) for 
workers receiving wage premia or generous fringe benefits, with substantial investment in firm-
specific skills, or those losing jobs in depressed local labor markets— since these individuals 
will have difficulty finding new positions that are comparable or superior to those they are 
departing. Such differences are accounted for by including the area unemployment rate and a 
variety of demographic and predisplacement job characteristics in the first-stage probit 
equation.
22
 
 
Two specifications of the treatment/effects model are estimated below. In the first, the treatment 
includes written notice of any duration (WRITTEN). Persons expecting job terminations in the 
absence of advance notice are deleted from this analysis to avoid a more complicated choice 
process which includes the possibility of informal notice. Thus, formally notified individuals are 
contrasted with counterparts surprised by the loss of jobs. In the second specification, the choice 
is between lengthy written notice (WRIT3) versus no notice of any sort, with workers obtaining 
briefer formal notification (WRITI and WRIT2) or informal notice excluded from the sample. 
The first two columns of table 5 show results for the first- stage probit notification equation; the 
third and fourth columns display coefficients from the second-stage wage equation. 
 
21.  Fallick (1991) has studied this issue in detail. 
22.  Marital status and family size are excluded from the probit model under the assumption that 
they have no effect on the ratio of predisplacement to alternative wages. 
 
The probit estimates generally conform to the predictions of the "employer-cost" model 
described above. Workers involved in plant closings, leaving highly unionized settings, or 
displaced late in the sample period receive notice relatively frequently, which is consistent with 
our expectation that these factors are associated with large costs of failing to notify. High pay or 
substantial fringe benefits (as proxied by health insurance coverage) on the predisplacement job 
are difficult to replicate and so are positively correlated with the receipt of advance warnings. 
Similarly, holding weekly earnings constant, part-time workers and women have low 
probabilities of finding comparable new employment and they are prenotified relatively often. 
Written notice is disproportionately furnished to workers with substantial seniority, reflecting 
their high levels of firm-specific skills, and lengthy notice is most common in local labor markets 
with elevated unemployment rates, where new jobs are hard to obtain. 
 
The education effect is less easily explained. If schooling provides general human capital, highly 
educated workers will have favorable employment alternatives and, if notified, may be expected 
to have high rates of premature quits. Firms will therefore find it costly to notify educated 
persons. The probit results indicate, however, that notification probabilities rise with years of 
schooling. One possibility is that the reputation costs of failing to provide advance notice are 
particularly large for educated workers and outweigh the benefits associated with reducing early 
departures. 
 
If firms minimize peremptory quits by disproportionately notifying workers with poor 
reemployment prospects, the reduced-form results in Section III will understate the wage 
differentials associated with randomly provided written advance notice. Results of the second-
stage wage equations verify this expectation. The inverse Mills coefficient is negative for both 
WRITTEN and WRIT3, although small and imprecisely measured in the former case, which 
implies that E(ε|N = 0) > E(ε|N = 1). The treatment/ effects estimates of the advance notice effect 
will therefore be larger than when the wage equation is estimated by OLS. As shown in table 5, 
the wage differential predicted by the two-stage model is 7.3% for WRITTEN and 33.6% for 
WRIT3; the corresponding OLS estimates (not shown) are a much smaller —2.5% and 10.8%, 
respectively.
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V. PREDISPLACEMENT SEARCH AND REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
The reduced-form estimates of Section III indicate that lengthy written notice is associated with 
an 8.1%-13.9% survey date earnings differential, and the three tests for exogeneity, detailed in 
Section IV, suggest that these estimates actually understate the size of the wage premix. 
 
Lengthy advance notice could be correlated with high subsequent pay for a variety of reasons. 
Most directly, early notification allows predisplacement search, which could raise wages by 
reducing liquidity constraints and thereby allowing workers to be more selective in their pursuit 
of jobs. Controlling for search durations, it may also be more efficient to search while employed 
than when jobless (e.g., employers might believe that unemployment is a signal of low 
productivity). 
 
Prenotification also allows workers to switch training investments from firm-specific to general 
human capital. However, as Hamermesh (1987) has emphasized, the.information would need to 
be received many months (or even years) in advance to significantly reduce the specific 
investment which is rendered worthless by the loss of jobs. Similarly, while early warnings 
might permit expenditures to be modified (in preparation for a period of lower incomes) or 
facilitate intrahousehold labor supply reallocations, the size of these adjustments is likely to be 
modest and so probably does not explain the wage differentials associated with lengthy notice.
24
 
 
Alternatively, prior notice may be correlated with higher wages, without having a causal effect. 
For instance, this could occur if notified individuals disproportionately receive other types of 
reemployment assistance such as outplacement benefits, job search counseling, skill retraining, 
or extended unemployment insurance.
25
 Moreover, advance notice and these supplemental forms 
of assistance could jointly produce larger benefits than would either in isolation. Lengthy written 
announcements might also be obtained, as part of a panoply of rents, by workers with strong 
bargaining power. If the gap between reservation and offer wages is especially wide for these 
 
23.  Even stronger evidence of negative selection is obtained when recently displaced workers are 
included in the sample. For example, the treatment/effects coefficient on WRIT3 implies a 58.4% wage 
differential, as compared to 11.0% in the OLS model, and the coefficient ( t-statistic) on λ is —0.206 
(2.99). The treatment/effects model was also estimated with informally notified workers grouped with the 
non- notified and included in the analysis. Using this more inclusive sample raises the estimated return to 
short periods of formal notice and has little impact on lengthy warnings. The coefficient on WRITTEN 
indicates an earnings differential of 25.0% and that on WRIT3 a premium of 32.9% (the associated t-
statistics are 1.45 and 1.88, respectively). 
24.  For example, Seitchik (1991) shows that extra work by wives typically replaces only a small 
fraction of the earnings lost when their husbands are displaced. 
25.  The exogeneity tests of Sec. IV implicitly assume that the same package of supplemental 
assistance that accompanies voluntary advance notice would be obtained with randomly provided 
prenotification. 
individuals, they are likely to obtain reemployment slowly but receive relatively high wages in 
their new jobs 
 
By examining how the notification wage premia vary with the duration of joblessness, indirect 
inferences can be drawn on the role of predisplacement search. If the early search is important, 
the largest differentials should be obtained by notified workers who avoid joblessness altogether 
or line up new positions during the notification period and start them shortly thereafter. 
Conversely, predisplacement job search is not expected to raise the pay of individuals who 
remain out of work for several months. 
 
If the wage gains associated with lengthy notice are concentrated among the subgroup with short 
spells of joblessness, it is therefore plausible to attribute a major role to predisplacement search. 
Conversely, differentials that are evenly distributed across nonemployment durations or dispro- 
portionately received by displaced workers with protracted joblessness indicate that employed 
search is less important while other mechanisms, such as employer-provided supplemental 
assistance programs, are responsible for the observed wage differentials.
26
 Unfortunately, the 
DWS contains no information on firm-sponsored displacement assistance efforts and so direct 
estimates of the effects of these programs cannot be obtained. 
 
The top panel of table 6 displays advance notice coefficients from OLS wage equations for 
subsamples stratified by weeks of joblessness. The pattern of earnings differentials is 
inconsistent with explanations placing primary importance on the role of predisplacement search. 
Workers who receive lengthy written notice and are out of work less than 5 weeks are predicted 
to earn only (a statistically insignificant) 2.6% more than their counterparts surprised by the loss 
of jobs. Among those jobless between 5 and 8 weeks, the coefficient on WRIT3 is actually 
negative! Thus, notification earnings differentials are small or absent for those workers pre- 
dicted to receive the greatest benefit from predisplacement search. 
 
In contrast, the wage premium associated with the longest written notice ranges from 21 % to 
49% for nonemployment spells lasting between 2 and 18 months. The extended joblessness 
belies the possibility that these earnings differences are due to predisplacement search. Instead, 
the results suggest that firms providing lengthy advance notice also offer various types 
of supplemental adjustment assistance. The negative coefficient on WRIT3, beyond 18 months, 
may indicate that the assistance efforts are either exhausted or of no help at very long 
durations.
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Postdisplacement wages decline with the duration of joblessness, raising the possibility that 
predisplacement search could benefit notified workers by raising exit rates out of 
nonemployment even without earnings differentials at given spell lengths. A series of probit 
models was estimated to investigate this prospect. In each case, the dependent variable indicates 
whether nonemployment spells were within or above the specified range of durations. For 
example, when considering the reemployment hazard rate at 5-8 weeks of joblessness, the 
dependent variable was set equal to one (zero) for respondents out of work between 5 and 8  
26.  These programs may benefit workers with prolonged as well as brief spells. For example, 
skill retraining is likely to be most useful for persons who complete (possibly lengthy) programs. 
27.  The large positive coefficient on WRIT2 for workers taking 6-12 months to find jobs suggests 
that adjustment assistance may also be important for some persons receiving shorter periods of written 
notice. 
 
 
(longer than 8) weeks, with persons finding jobs in less than 5 weeks excluded from the sample. 
The notification coefficients obtained from the reemployment probits are displayed in the second 
panel of table 6. 
 
There is no evidence that lengthy written notice increases the proportion of short spells. To the 
contrary, early announcements are associated with little or no change in the probability of 
reemployment within 1 month, with much lower rates of job finding between 1 and 2 months, 
and with somewhat to dramatically reduced hazard rates between 2 and 6 months. 
 
The combined pattern of wage and reemployment differentials is consistent with the receipt of 
supplemental unemployment benefits which raise reservation wages and lower rates of 
reemployment. Supplemental unemployment insurance (UI) does not provide the entire 
explanation however. At durations of 6-18 months, the reemployment hazard rates associated 
with lengthy advance notice are as high as or higher than those receiving no notice, while the 
former group continues to receive large positive wage differentials. Wages and reemployment 
hazard rates are similarly elevated, at durations of 9-12 months, for individuals receiving 1-2 
months written notice. The simultaneous increase in wages and nonemployment exit rates 
suggests the importance of assistance other than supplemental UI benefits (e.g., skill 
retraining).
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Workers receiving 2 or more months of advance notice obtain sizable wage premix in subsequent 
employment. These higher earnings do not result because firms disproportionately notify 
workers with favorable reemployment prospects. To the contrary, three separate tests for endo-
geneity indicate that the differentials would be still larger if notification were provided randomly 
and accompanied by the same types of adjustment assistance currently received by notified 
workers. 
 
Nor are the findings favorable to the hypothesis that advance notice raises wages by allowing 
predisplacement search. Were this the case, the prenotification differentials would be 
concentrated among workers with short nonemployment spells or avoiding joblessness 
altogether. Instead, the wage premia are primarily observed among persons reemployed after 
fairly long durations of joblessness. 
 
The positive correlation between lengthy written notice and subsequent earnings may be the 
result of spurious correlation, where firms offering formal notice also frequently provide 
adjustment assistance such as job search counseling, skill retraining, supplemental 
unemployment insurance, or outplacement programs. Similarly, there may be an interaction 
between advance notice and reemployment assistance such that the combined effect is greater 
than either would be in isolation. 
 
Based on these results, it is premature to conclude that the recent passage of federal legislation 
mandating advance notice will ease the adjustment problems of displaced workers. Although 
prenotification may have an independent effect on subsequent wages, the mechanism of 
influence is unclear and is unrelated or only weakly related to predisplacement search behavior. 
The results are consistent, however, with the possibility that advance notice raises the 
effectiveness of other types of displacement assistance. Thus, there is little doubt about the 
desirability of voluntarily provided reemployment assistance, of which prenotification is only 
one part. 
28. To further test the role of predisplacement search, wage equations were estimated with 
potential search duration, measured in a variety of ways, controlled for. In no case were unusually large 
gains obtained by workers receiving lengthy written notice and quickly finding new employment. To cite 
one example, potential search durations were set equal to weeks of joblessness plus 0, 1, 5, and 9 weeks, 
respectively, for persons receiving no formal notice, less than 1, 1-2, or greater than 2 months of written 
notice. Wage equations were then estimated for the group with less than 14 weeks of potential search 
(corresponding to fewer than 5 weeks of nonemployment for workers receiving lengthy written notice). 
The resulting coefficient (t-statistic) on WRIT3 was 0.076 (1.10). This implies a wage differential of 7.9%, 
which is 2.6% less than that obtained when persons with lengthier search were retained in the sample. 
The findings may also have implications for evaluating the relative efficiency of employed 
versus unemployed search. Workers aware that their jobs will soon end have a greater incentive 
to engage in job search than do their counterparts in stable employment. Thus, the gains from 
employed search among soon-to-be-displaced persons are likely to be larger than for the typical 
worker. Nonetheless, this study finds little evidence that pre- displacement search is more 
efficient than searching while out of work. This may lend credence to macroeconomic theories 
emphasizing search unemployment. 
 
Appendix A 
 
Description of Variables Used in Analysis 
 
Continuous variables: 
Log of Survey Date Wage = natural log of real weekly wage at survey date  
Log of Previous Wage = natural log of real weekly wage at time of displacement 
Experience = years of potential labor market experience (age — education — 6 ) 
Experience Squared = experience  experience 
Education = years of schooling (censored at 17 years) 
Education Squared = education  education 
Tenure = number of years working for the predisplacement employer  
Tenure Squared = tenure  tenure 
No. of Children = number of children under the age of 18 
Weeks of Joblessness = duration of initial spell of joblessness (censored at 99 weeks) 
Area Unemployment Rate = unemployment rate in displacement year for 50 largest 
SMSAs or state (U.S. Department of Labor, May 1982-88) 
Industry Unionization Rate = average 1987 unionization rate by three- digit industry 
(Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson 1990) 
Occupation Unionization Rate = average 1987 unionization rate by three-digit occupation 
(Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson 1990)  
Log of Unemployment Benefit = natural log of average 1986 weekly state UI benefit 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1988) 
 
Dummy Variables (equal to one if): 
Married = married with spouse living in household 
Female = female 
Black = black 
Other Nonwhite = Hispanic, Asian, or other (nonblack) nonwhite  
Previous Part-Time = part-time work (self-defined) in predisplacement job  
Previous Health Insurance = included in group health insurance plan in predisplacement 
job 
Displaced by Plant Closing = job terminated due to plant closure or relocation 
Survey Date = 1990 = survey date is January 1990 
Displaced N Years Previous = displacement occurred N years prior to survey date 
Informal Notice = displacement "expected" in absence of written advance notice 
WRITTEN = received written advance notice of displacement  
WRIT1 = received < 1 months written advance notice of displacement  
WRIT2 = received 1-2 months written advance notice of displacement  
WRIT3 = received > 2 months written advance notice of displacement Right-to-Work 
State = resides in "right-to-work" state (U.S. Department of Commerce 1988) 
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